What is (our understanding of) constructivism?

As we said before, we define constructivism as a broad epistemological framework based on the notion of human beings and human systems as proactive meaning makers and language users.

Constructivist metatheory has been referred to (and still is) differently according to different authors. What is common to all forms of constructivism is the assumption that our knowledge is not an inner and passive representation of "the world as it is", but a product of our constructions (see Botella, 1995). The historical roots of constructivist thought date back to pre-Socratic philosophy, and can be traced along the whole history of human ideas (see, e.g., Mahoney, 1991).

As for the nature of knowledge, constructivist metatheory assumes that knowledge is an anticipatory construction. Thus, it departs from the traditional objectivist conception of knowledge as an internalized representation of external reality. This constructivist epistemic assumption can be traced back to Kant's philosophy, to Popper's notion that no knowledge originates in pure observation, since every act of observation is theory laden, and to Wittgenstein's conception of language as constitutive rather than representative.

Constructivism cannot rely on the original/copy correspondence metaphor, since it departs from a representational conception of knowledge. Justification by means of the authority of truth is then regarded as an illusion, a "never-achieved ideal or horizon-concept" (Howard, 1986, p. 134). This non-justificationist position leaves constructivist metatheory facing the task of articulating an alternative set of epistemic values (i.e., "criteria employed by scientists to choose among competing theoretical explanations" p. 135)--taking into account that values are, by definition, subjective preferences.

Although constructivist epistemic values vary according to different constructivist theories, all of them can be viewed as alternatives to the justificationist position. Two of the most pervasive sets of epistemic values in constructivist metatheory, however, correspond to (a) the pragmatic value of knowledge claims (i.e., their predictive efficiency, viability, and fertility), and (b) the coherence of knowledge claims (i.e., their internal and external consistency, rhetorical qualities, and unifying power). Some constructivist theories have, nevertheless, incorporated epistemic values traditionally alien to scientific reasoning. For instance, narrative psychology and some forms of social constructionism adopt literary/aesthetic and rhetorical criteria to assess the quality of knowledge claims. Different knowledge domains (e.g., science, politics, arts, and law) incorporate different conventional criteria--i.e., different epistemic values--to assess whether a given argument is well constructed. In history, for instance, a given knowledge claim is preferred to the extent that it helps to retrospectively explain events. In literary fiction, narratives that adjust to a good narrative form are preferred over those that do not. In philosophy and law, claims are assessed according to their rhetorical qualities. In music, poetry, and the visual arts, the emotional impact of a given work is often used as a criterion of its quality. Scientific knowledge is not viewed by constructivist metatheory as a privileged and exclusive means to access reality. Consequently, some constructivist theories metaphorically equate all knowledge with scientific knowledge--e.g., Kelly's (1955/1991) metaphor of the person as an everyday scientist--or scientific knowledge with other forms of knowledge--e.g., Gergen and Gergen's (1986) notion of scientific knowledge as a narrative construction.

A series of corollaries can be derived from these two basic epistemic assumptions of constructivist metatheory. In fact, different constructivist theories emphasize different possible corollaries. This differential emphasis led to the proliferation of what Neimeyer (1993, p. 224) terms the "varieties of constructivist experience" and to the liveliness of current conversations and debates within the constructivist community and outside of it.

What is (our understanding of) discourse processess?

We use the term "discourse" to refer to "a set of statements that constitute an object" (Burr, 1995, p. 184). In this sense, objects (or, at least, their meaning) do not precede discourse, but are created in discourse. Thus, psychology’s basic question can no longer be, "what is a human being?" but "what kind of human being is constructed by our theoretical discourse?" As can be seen, this is a clearly anti-essentialist position. Having said that, it would be clear again that the ultimate criteria of the "quality" of a given discourse cannot be its truthfulness assessed via a contrast with reality, because reality is co-created by that very discourse.

The decision of focusing the study of psychological processes from an objectivist or constructivist standpoint is related to a previous and inevitable ontological assumption. The researcher, theorist or practitioner needs to ask him or herself about the ontological status of the object he or she is working with. This need is common to all science, and not posing it explicitly leads only to assume an implicit answer. To sum up, the key question in this point is what is the level of existence of the phenomena to which psychological knowledge is applied.

Traditionally, this question has received two answers in the course of the history of psychology. The first one, closely aligned with objectivism, is inspired in a partial understanding of Newtonian physics, and asserts the objective existence of psychological phenomena. In fact, this perspective rather proscribes (i.e., forbids) that anything not measurable and observable, or without a clear biological/material referent, becomes an object of psychological study. The best example of this position applied to psychology is orthodox behaviorism, with its traditional emphasis on the study of observable behavior.

Nevertheless, the historical blind alley to which behaviorism was led (visible in clinical psychology in the evolution from behavior therapy to cognitive-behavior therapy) reflects the infertility of a psychology that excludes as an object of study everything that is most essentially human, such as language, consciousness, memory, or emotions. Driven to this point, we face the key question of what is the ontological status of the "phenomena" just mentioned.

In our opinion, two options are opened again in front of us (particularly as clinical psychologists and psychotherapists). The first one consists of a rebirth of the discourse of objectivism, even though far from the rigors of behaviorism, and can be seen in the attempt to reduce all psychological processes to their biological components. Thus, we can equate psychology to the study of the biological (i.e., physiological, genetic, neurological…) manifestations of psychological processes. Certainly, we are currently witnessing an impressive growth of the popularity of such an approach (called the medico/biological model by some authors) evident in some best-selling books on the supposed genetic origin of intelligence, gender or ethnic differences, etc.

The medico/biological model applied to clinical psychology can be sketched in a series of related assumptions regarding the nature of "mental diseases" and their cure:

(a) Mental diseases have an etiology or cause; (b) Etiology is organic; (c) Organic etiology produces the symptoms; (d) The set of symptoms of a mental disease leads to its diagnostic; (e) The diagnostic leads to a prognostic; (f) The biological treatment of a mental disease must be focused on its cause.

The medico/biological model in psychology, as a manifestation of an objectivist discourse, has its own logic of justification, research programs, forms of practice, ethical principles, and even professional and academic communities. Nevertheless, those who present it as the only possible way to construe clinical psychology should bear in mind that it has turned out to be more fallible than they usually admit. In his detailed and documented critique, Vallejo (1985) highlights, for example, the difficulty to define the term "mental disease" (and "mental health"), to find the "organic cause" of most psychological disorders, the subjectivity of some diagnostic labels (see also Kleinke, 1994), and the only partial effectiveness of some biomedical treatments even in the case of disorders with a likely biological cause such as psychosis.

The alternative to the study of psychological processes as manifestations of a biological substratum with a real existence is to approach them discursively. In a recent and detailed formulation of this position, Martin (1994) highlights how most psychological processes (in contrast with physical/material processes) cannot be decomposed in "atoms" with an ultimate referent in reality.

From a constructivist position, approaching psychological processes always entails approaching a form of social or personal construction of these processes. Psychology cannot reach reality in its essence, as objectivism claims, but the way in which individuals or communities make sense of their experience. As Zen Buddhists would say, "the finger pointing at the moon is not the moon itself". This may seem like a subtle difference, but it is a fundamental one.

Before closing this section, however, we would like to highlight a point mentioned among others by Martin (1994) that we regard as essential, since it can lead to a serious misunderstanding of constructivism. Stating that the objects of psychology are products of discursive constructions and processes does not mean that they have no effects or that they cannot be approached with scientific quality. Collective or individual constructions of experience are anchored in social, cultural, linguistic, historical, and discursive conventions that, even if they change, they do not do so overnight. It is within these conventions, not precisely ephemeral, where psychology as a science makes sense. In other words, even if "depression" is approached as a socially shared label to make sense of a form of human experience, and not only as a disorder with a medical cause, this does not mean at all that depression does not exist, that it does not cause suffering to depressed people, that nothing therapeutic can be done about it or that it cannot be the object of scientific research. The difference between these two approaches to depression, however, is the ontological status attributed to the phenomenon. An objectivist position would consider depression as something located in the biological substratum or in some psychological trait with an objective existence, while constructivism would locate it in the domain of socially shared forms of construing human experience.

What is (our understanding of) postmodern thought?

Polkinghorne (1992) defines postmodern thought as a reaction to the limits of modernist epistemology. According to him, modernism aligned itself with a worldview based on the metaphor of an ordered universe, ruled by mathematical laws that could eventually be uncovered by science. The modernist program had its origin in the works of XVII century philosophers and scientists such as Descartes and Newton, who endeavored to counterbalance Montaigne's skepticism and to find a solid epistemic ground for their metaphysical beliefs (cf., Toulmin, 1990). Modernist epistemology found its more articulated expression three centuries later, in the program of the Vienna Circle. This selected group of philosophers and scientists contributed to renew the epistemic foundations of XIX century positivism by incorporating the logico-mathematical notions developed by Russell and Whitehead. Paradoxically, the Vienna Circle's attempt to elucidate the epistemic ground of scientific knowledge (particularly as carried out by Popper) contributed to cut this very ground from under science's feet. The underlying theme in the raising of a postmodern consciousness echoes the notions of loss of faith (Polkinghorne, 1992), incredulity (Lyotard, 1993), ambivalence (Bauman, 1993), and disbelief (Anderson, 1990) towards the modernist program.

While radically relativistic forms of postmodern epistemology are at odds with constructivism, Polkinghorne's (1992) affirmative definition differs from relativism in including neopragmatic criteria for choosing among knowledge claims. Thus, Polkinghorne's notion of postmodern epistemology includes the following four basic themes: (a) foundationlessness, (b) fragmentariness, (c) constructivism, and (d) neopragmatism.

Foundationlessness, according to Polkinghorne (1992), refers to the notion that we human beings have no direct access to reality, but only to the product of our constructions. Thus, human knowledge is inevitably speculative, since we have no definite epistemic foundation on which to build it.

Fragmentariness refers to the postmodern emphasis on the local and situated, instead of the general and totalizing. According to Polkinghorne (1992, p. 149), "knowledge should be concerned with these local and specific occurrences, not with the search for context-free general laws". In fact, the very notion of context-free general laws is meaningless in postmodern epistemology; due to the post-structuralist influence on postmodern thought, it is assumed that every text is understandable only when located in its context.

Constructivism as Polkinghorne (1992) uses the term is closely related to foudationlessness, and refers to the notion that:

Human knowledge is not a mirrored reflection of reality, neither the reality of surface chaos nor that of (if they exist) universal structures. Human knowledge is a construction built from the cognitive processes (which mainly operate out of awareness) and embodied interactions with the world of material objects, others and the self. (Polkinghorne, 1992, p. 150).

Polkinghorne aptly notes that the three themes of foundationlessness, fragmentariness, and constructivism may generate a relativistic epistemology. So far, it is possible to assert that no knowledge claim can be privileged, but this radical relativism leaves one unable to act upon the world, to make choices, to take stands. Thus, a fourth theme should be included if postmodern thought is to avoid solipsism and nihilism; the theme of neopragmatism.

Neopragmatism according to Polkinghorne (1992) concentrates on local and applied knowledge. Polkinghorne's emphasis on pragmatic and situated knowledge is common to other proponents of a postmodern psychology, such as Gergen (1992), and Kvale (1992c). The neopragmatic question is not whether a given proposition is true (i.e., is it an accurate representation of reality?) but whether accepting it as if it were true leads to the anticipated outcome. Neopragmatic knowledge is thus based on the predictive usefulness of a particular proposition. The link between neopragmatism and earlier American pragmatism (particularly in William James' version) is obvious; James equated truth with satisfactoriness and satisfactoriness with predictive usefulness (see Suckiel, 1982). However, neopragmatism differs from earlier pragmatism in that the former does not hold that knowledge claims can be accumulated and progress toward a final state--such a proposition would be inconsistent with postmodern foundationlessness, fragmentariness, and constructivism.

What is (our understanding of) narrative psychology?

Narrative psychology as discussed by Sarbin (1986) proposes narrative emplotment as the organizing principle in the proactive construction of meaning. According to Sarbin (1986) human beings make sense of otherwise unrelated events by imposing a narrative structure on them. Thus, for instance, when presented two or three pictures, we tend to emplot a story that relate them to each other in some way and help us predict how will it likely evolve. Narrative emplotment, then, equates knowledge with the anticipatory construction of narrative meaning.

Both Sarbin (1986) and Spence (1986) propose narrative smoothing as the criterion according to which a given knowledge claim is tacitly chosen. In his approach to self-deception, Sarbin (1986) notes how some people maintain self-narratives that are apparently counter-factual, a phenomenon traditionally explained by means of such mechanistic constructs as repression or dissociation. When narrative smoothing is used as an explanatory principle, however, such constructs are redundant. Narrative psychology proposes that people tacitly edit their self-narratives (by spelling out inconsistent information) "so that the self as a narrative figure is protected, defended, or enhanced" (Sarbin, 1986, p. 17). Thus, narrative psychology shares the constructivist critique of knowledge justification by means of its correspondence with objective reality.

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